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The Poetics of Meaningful Work: an Analogy to Speech Acts1 
 
Meaningful work refers to the idea that human work is inherently meaningful beyond its aim of 
fulfilling necessary ends. Work, in other words, is an integral part of the way humans think of their 
ůŝǀĞƐĂƐŐŽŝŶŐǁĞůů ?dŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŚĂƐŝƚƐƌŽŽƚƐŝŶƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚďƌĂŚĂŵDĂƐůŽǁ ?Ɛ
(1994 [1971]) psychological research on human nature and self-actualization. Studies in psychology 
and sociology that build on this research tend to focus on practical application (e.g. Bailey and Madden 
2015; Chalofsky 2003), and this approach has gained more coverage as businesses begin to see how 
satisfaction about meaning in work correlates with increased individual productivity (e.g. Lau 2000; 
Steger et al 2012: 323, 333). In philosophy, the discussion tends to revolve around political questions, 
especially on matters of justice and whether the State should take steps to eradicate or lessen the 
presence of meaningless work (e.g. Arneson 1987; Roessler 2012; Sayer 2009; Veltman 2016; Walsh 
1994; Yeoman 2014). 
 However, there is on my view a serious lacuna in the general literature that I will discuss in 
terms of conceptual and historical assumptions. My worry is that ǁŚŝůĞ ĐŝƚŝŶŐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ǁŽƌŬ ?Ɛ
meaningfulness, the literature does not really give an account of how the relation between the 
operations of work and flourishing is achieved. In other words, what remains unexplored is the causal 
or mechanistic relation (loosely put) between what is being done in and by work and the actualization, 
exercise, or development of capacities we deem valuable. So as we might think of how work produces 
objects, one can say there remains an unanswered question in the literature about how 
meaningfulness is produced by work. I think drawing an analogy to speech acts can be very helpful 
here, and this would involve seeing meaning production as a kind of poetics. 
The poetics of work can be said to involve two levels. On the one hand, meaning arises with 
respect to instrumental and conventional ends. On the other hand, work tends to drive beyond means-
ends relations that were not originally anticipated at the first level. As we will see, I argue that the 
second level is crucial to the human capacity for creative innovation since it allows for new ontological 
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possibilities (in the Heideggerian sense) for human existence. I will refer to the two levels respectively 
as the constitutive and extra-constitutive dimensions of meaning, where the former involves meaning 
constitution according to rules of instrumentality and conventionality and the latter meaning 
constitution above and beyond these rules.  
By employing an analogy to speech acts, I will give an account of how we can better 
understand work not simply as producing meaning but predicating it. As we will see, this approach has 
distinct advantages with regard to the way it situates work within a field of communicability that is 
limited to neither merely what values one associates with work (conceptual assumption), nor to a 
reduction of human existence to material relations (historical assumption). I aim to develop this 
ƉŽĞƚŝĐƐĨƌŽŵWĂƵůZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?ƐŚĞƌŵĞŶĞƵƚŝĐƐǁŚĞƌĞŚĞargues, vis-à-ǀŝƐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƐƉĞĞĐŚ
acts, that like discourse, action has locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary features that refigure 
 ?ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?dŚĞƵƉƐŚŽƚŝƐƚŚĂƚďǇĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐŽŶZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶto 
include work, we will see how work is a unique type of action with distinct locutionary, illocutionary, 
and perlocutionary capacities for creating meaning. 
Because exploring the analogy will require threshing out quite a bit of detail, I offer here a 
summation of my argument. The constitutive dimension of work involves its instrumentality and 
conventionality, or more specifically, what we will see are its locutionary and illocutionary meanings. 
Locution has to do with properly instrumental ends and illocution with conventional ends that meet 
normative expectations about the quality of performance.2 Despite the difference between 
instrumentality and conventionality, locution and illocution both involve constitutive rules of making 
and using: the former constitutive rules of instrumentality; the latter constitutive rules of 
conventionality. The extra-constitutive dimension pertains to effects that extend beyond the 
instrumental and conventional. I referred to these above in terms of ontological possibilities for 
existing, and they should be taken to involve novel interpretations of what it means to be and how we 
understand ourselves, the world, and others. These effects are perlocutionary since, as we will see, 
they arise as a kind of by-product of work. 
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 The essay is divided into five sections. The first section provides a brief justification of my claim 
that the general literature on meaningful work only assumes work to be meaningful. The second 
section examines the nature of work via the analogy to speech acts, while the third provides more 
detail about the extra-constitutive dimension of work. The final section concludes by way of 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĞǆƚƌĂ-constitutive function in view of human capabilities. 
 
The Assumption that Work is Meaningful 
The assumption that work is meaningful comes in at least two varieties ? a conceptual assumption 
relying on associations made with respect to human flourishing and a historical assumption based on 
DĂƌǆ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƚŚĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐƐŚĂƌĞ in the general characterization 
that meaningfulness is linked in some way to necessity. The conceptual assumption presents a weak 
thesis on necessity since it emphasizes how work plays an unavoidable role in the development of our 
attitudes about well-being (e.g. Attfield 2001: 46; Roessler 2012: 91; cf. Yeoman 204: 241 W242). On 
this view, many other kinds of activity can perform this role; however, because work is something we 
cannot escape, it requires that we give it serious attention. The historical assumption presents a strong 
ƚŚĞƐŝƐŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐŝƚƚĂŬĞƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƌŽůĞƚŽďĞŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?dŚĂƚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ǁŽƌŬŝƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů
to the formation of ourselves and the world. Work is indispensable, and no other activity can replace 
its formative function. 
 
a) the conceptual assumption  
The conceptual assumption involves associating work with the development or exercise of 
things constitutive of human flourishing ? e.g. autonomy, self-esteem, virtue, self-respect, etc. Much 
of the general literature is devoted to demonstrating why these associations are important, with 
controversy arising in how we are to order, rank, or edit the list of these features (Attfield 2001, 
Veltman 2016, Walsh 1994). Reflection on and observation of occupations as well as worker testimony 
are prime sources of evidence. 
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  Philosophical accounts that involve this assumption tend to overstep an account of 
meaningfulness because they have other concerns in view. This omission is reasonable within the 
confines of debates focused solely on justice. For example, Ruth Yeoman (2014: 236) uses the premise 
ƚŚĂƚǁŽƌŬĐƌĞĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂƌŐƵĞĂŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůǁŽƌŬĨŽƌ
Ăůů  ?ŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽďĞ ?ĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ? /ŶŚŝƐǁŽƌŬŽŶ contributive justice, Andrew Sayer 
(2009: 2; cf. Gomberg 2007: 152) treats work generally under the umbrella of doing. As with other 
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŝƐĂŵĂŶŶĞƌŽĨĚŽŝŶŐŝŶůŝĨĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŚĂƐĂƐŵƵĐŚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶǁŚŽǁĞďĞĐŽŵĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨŽƵƌůŝǀĞƐ ? ?>ŝŬĞzĞŽŵĂŶ ?^ĂǇĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ? 10 W11) assumes a link between work and the 
effect it has on well-being and self-development. Anca Gheaus and Lisa Herzon (2016: 70) discuss this 
ďĞŶĞĨŝƚǁŝĚĞůǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶŶĞƌďǇǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽĚƐŽĨǁŽƌŬĐĂŶďĞƌĞĂĚĂƐƵŶƉĂĐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇƐ
in which wŽƌŬĐĂŶďĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů ? ?Such discussions are important in conceiving how the availability 
of meaningful work might be nurtured. My concern is that the conceptual associations made between 
work and aspects of flourishing remain assumed. Little is said about how work achieves these ends, 
and so it becomes questionable, on the one hand, as to whether we can in fact make these claims and, 
on the other hand, as to why we should think work is any different than the other activities that 
promote flourishing (cf. Nicholas Smith 2007: 193). 
But the problem does not simply appear to be one contingent upon how the debates about 
justice have been shaped. A possible reason why the association occurs, and which would need more 
development than I can give it here, is that work is at root conceived as a physical endeavour. Linking 
it to human flourishing often involves attempting to draw relations to activities that involve mental 
activity (reasoning, imagining, etc.). Hence, James Murphy (1993), Adrian Walsh (1994), and Paul 
Gomberg (2007) refer explicitly to meaningful work as a relation between theory and practice. Yet the 
task of relating the physical act to the intellectual, for a lack of better terms, requires more than just 
an association of the two and more than just describing the two as local to instances of work. We 
might want to refer to this as the work-flourishing gap which calls for an account of how the former 
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produces the latter. As we will see, what the analogy to speech acts provides is a way of rethinking 
the phenomenon of meaningfulness as an action (cf. Cavell 1995: 50 W51). 
  
b) the historical assumption  
If Marx has established work as an activity distinct to the human species being, it can be 
tempting simply to rely on his account as having observed something true about the nature of work 
(e.g. Muirhead 2004: 13 W14). In fact, his account is somewhat straightforward. The production of 
things in work allows human beings to reflect on themselves. So objectification in work means that as 
we labor, we come to recognize ourselves and our capabilities (Marx 1988: 107 W08). It is only work 
that can do this since it is only work that involves the use of material as the medium of self-
consciousness. In fact, all other relations depend upon what we fashion in work because all other 
relations build upon material necessity. Marx therefore does indeed give an account of how work 
produces meaning, and he also shows how work is not only unlike any other activity but is 
foundational. 
Given how social relations of production have developed beyond the conditions on which 
Marx was reflecting, allegations are made that his account is not relevant in an age where work does 
not necessarily produce an object. Service work in particular often comprises a significant portion of 
ĂĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?3 But there are also other forms of labor, such as acquisition, exchange, 
and speculation that do not produce objects. Responding to these criticisms, Sean Sayers (2007) 
ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDĂƌǆǁŝƚŚĂ ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨůĂďŽƌŝƐŝŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĂŶĚĨĂŝůƐƚŽ
take notice of certain philosophical subtleties that Marx retains from Hegel. In particular, the 
formative nature of labor does not narrowly mean labor that forms objects but rather that any act of 
labor is formative of the human spirit (Hegel) or consciousness (Marx). In short, any act of labor is an 
act that transforms the human relation to nature and thus the human self-ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?^ĂǇĞƌƐ ?




'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ďƌĞĂĚƚŚ ŽĨ DĂƌǆ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁ ? Ă ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ ŵĞƌĞůǇ
assuming his argument. Honneth notes, for instance, that this assumption is  ‘ĂĐůĂƐƐŝĐŵŽƚŝĨ ?ƚŚĂƚ 
  
always took it as a given that socially established forms of labor were not only to be judged 
according to whether their execution is recognized appropriately, but also according to 
whether their structure and organization provide chances for self-realization. (Honneth 2007: 
359)  
  
Though critical of this motif, Honneth (2007: 359 W360) admits that it is adequate at a basic level when 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐďƌŽĂĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚũƵƐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚǁŽƌŬ ?/ƚŝƐŝŶĨĂĐƚĞĂƐǇĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽĨƌĂŵĞDĂƌǆ ?Ɛ
diagnosis of the exploitation of labor and the problem of meaningless work in terms of the recognition 
theory at the heart of ,ŽŶŶĞƚŚ ?Ɛ critical thought. Insofar as work is exploitative and fails to act as a 
means to flourishing suggests that laborers are reified as commodities instead of recognized as the 
genuine factor of value creation (cf. Honneth 2008: 75 W85; 2007: 343 W344). And while it may tend 
towards strong views about a perfectionism focused on creating non-alienating work across society, 
it nonetheless functions as a sound critical foundation for arguing how current modes of work may be 
alienating and require revision (Nicholas Smith 2009). 
 Apart from this critical, diagnostic virtue, there is a problem with how Marx takes work to be 
ontologically foundational and therefore indispensable. There is a short and long version of this 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? dŚĞ ƐŚŽƌƚ ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ƚŚĂƚ DĂƌǆ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǁŽƌŬ ǁŝƚŚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ŶĞŐůĞĐƚƐ Ă
further investigation of what other operations might be innate to work and contribute to the role of 
meaning production that are not reducible to necessity. 
dŚĞůŽŶŐĞƌǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƐŵŽƌĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŶĞŐůĞĐƚ ?DĂƌǆĐĂŶŶŽƚƌĞĂůůǇĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĞǆƚƌĂ-
necessary role because it would result in a contradiction.5 If self-realization arises only through 
addressing material necessity, any content Marx attempts to give to this process struggles to free itself 
from being determined by this necessity. Why? Because material necessity acts as a constraint on 
 7 
 
what can be considered authentic. Ideal content risks abstracting the relation to material necessity, 
and can even risk contradicting it, as in cases where ideology assumes a primary evaluative position. 
In fact, Marx (1976: 958 W59) can only bluntly associate work with something ideal like freedom but 
cannot delineate how what is most fundamental to us in terms of meeting material necessity can ever 
be linked to a freedom that is distinct from it. Either freedom really only is a mode of work, or work is 
in some sense merely a means to a categorically distinct mode of freedom. Marx may provide us with 
the conceptual tools to recognize the conditions of alienating labor, but his philosophy of work can 
only gesture towards how non-alienating work does more than merely meet material needs.6 
 
So what is at stake in these two assumptions? On the one hand, the conceptual assumption clearly 
confronts problems with respect to its evidence that work is meaningful. First, by relying on testimony 
observation, it opens itself to criticisms of subjectivism (ĐĨ ? ‘ƐƵďũĞĐƚ-ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶWalsh 1994: 236 W
37; Veltman 2016: 111) ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨǁŽƌŬĚĞƌŝǀĞƐĨƌŽŵŽŶĞ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽƌƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?ŶĚ
in this sense, derivation is not meaning at all but merely the expression of attitudes or preferences.7 
However, the problem of subjectivism is only symptomatic of a more fundamental one. Second, in 
whatever way one wishes to employ evidence, citation of it does not explain the relation between 
flourishing and work (cf. Cavell 1958: 182) but merely presupposes it. The general literature provides 
a great deal of analysis of how aspects of human flourishing can be linked to work. Yet nothing apart 
ĨƌŽŵǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇŵĂŬĞƐŝƚĂƵŶŝƋƵĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞĨŽƌproducing such flourishing.8 Does this mean 
that even with citation to evidence, the conceptual assumption reduces to a relation of expression 
(between work and concepts of flourishing)? I think it does not only if we can provide an account of 
how that relation develops. 
As we have seen, the historical assumption attempts to provide this account with respect to 
ĂƐƚƌŽŶŐƚŚĞƐŝƐĂďŽƵƚǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐ/ŚĂǀĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽƐŚŽǁ ?
while this identification between work and necessity gives it prominence by virtue of its being 
indispensable to human existence, it has a severe shortcoming. To define work as a necessary activity, 
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without further clarification of how it participates in extra-necessary ends or meanings, reduces work 
to a servile dimension. Work is thus fateĚƚŽƉůĂǇƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐǁĞ
might associate with freedom and meaning. Marx recognizes this problem and attempts to remedy it, 
though on my view insufficiently. Work may indeed be fundamental but only as a means to an end 
distinct from its material aim. So is there a way of conceiving work as not only capable of but integral 
to the actualization of meaning in existence ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƐŝŵƉůǇĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
attitudes nor a reduction to the fulfilment of necessary ends? 
 
The Analogy to Speech Acts 
Why analogy? Taking aspects of language as analogous to work provides a heuristic advantage. The 
analogy will allow us to avoid the tendency of thinking work is narrowly tied to necessity. So the 
analogy is speculative, allowing aspects of speech acts to illuminate the way work operates when 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? /ǁŝůůĚƌĂǁŽŶZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ?ď P  ? ? ?ŽǁŶƵƐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞĂŶĂůŽŐǇǁŚĞŶĐŽŶĐĞŝǀŝŶŐ
meaningful action as a text (fixed discourse). While he relies on distinctions made by J. L. Austin (1975) 
ĂŶĚŶƚŚŽŶǇ<ĞŶŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƐƉĞĞĐŚĂĐƚƐŝƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ
these different theories. Consequently, I do not engage with the wider debates about speech act 
theory; though, I do draw on literature that Ricoeur does not treat in order to clarify my own 
contributions or to help distinguish my understanding of his position from others. Furthermore, I do 
ŶŽƚ ƚƌĞĂƚZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĨŽƌƐĞĞŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ-like but recapitulate his key points in 
order to show their relevance for rethinking the nature of work. Bearing this in mind, Ricoeur uses 
speech act theory to argue that action has locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary dimensions. 
My primary aim in this section is to show ŚŽǁZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶĂůůŽǁƐƵƐƚŽƐĞĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ
unique about the way human work operates. Indeed, we can speak of work as predicating meaning 
with respect to locution, illocution, and perlocution. Respectively, these meanings are instrumental, 





The locutionary dimension of action concerns its propositional content. Here, the act of doing 
is analogous to an act of proposing something about a state of affairs (Searle 1969: 26).9 If locutions 
are coŶƐƚĂƚŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƵƚƚĞƌƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚĂƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ? ‘/ƚŝƐƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? ? ?ZŝĐŽĞƵƌ
(1973b: 99; cf. Kenny 1963: 156 W57) maintains that action also proposes in this way due to the 
polyadicity of the verbs of action. No action is merely indifferent or vacuous, and this is because as a 
 ‘ƌĞĂĚĞƌ ? ŽĨ ĂŶ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ǁĞ ĚƌŝǀĞ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝƚŝĞƐ
involved in an action and which therefore constitute a description of what is occurring. What may 
seem a vacuous action ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘WůĂƚŽƚĂƵŐŚƚ ? ?is really elliptical since the action draws our attention 
ƚŽĐůĂƌŝĨǇŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ PĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ‘ǁŚŽŵĚŝĚWůĂƚŽƚĞĂĐŚ ? ?Žƌ ‘ǁŚĂƚĚŝĚWůĂƚŽƚĞĂĐŚ ? ? ?<ĞŶŶǇ ? ? ? ? P
157). The process of following the action as a reader is possible because we take action to be saying 
something about a state of affairs that either elicits our curiosity or requires clarification. Extending 
this analogy, Ricoeur (1973b: 100) maintains that the sense-reference relation that opens discourse 
to analysis (Austin 1975: 109) can be found in action. That Plato taught someone relies on the senses 
of the actor and action that are read with respect to a specific situation: Plato taught Glaucon about 
justice. It is worthwhile noting that Ricoeur (1986: 256) views action as already expressive, to use John 
^ĞĂƌůĞ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ƚĞƌŵ ?ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨŝƚďĞŝŶŐƐǇŵďŽůŝĐ ?ŽƌǀĂůƵĞ-laden, to put it crudely. The analogy 
here requires, of course, that there is no vicious circularity in representing action linguistically in order 
to argue that action is meaningful according to certain linguistic features. So to observe the action 
that Plato taught ŝƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƐ ‘WůĂƚŽƚĂƵŐŚƚ ? ?tŚŝůĞZŝĐŽĞƵƌ is 
silent on this requirement, it is nonetheless consistent with his invocation of the hermeneutic circle 
to say that the explanation of something like an action involves an understanding whose medium is 
language (Ricoeur 1973b: 116 W117). An action is only action because it can be signified, that is, 
represented as something outside the immanent flux of existing.10 
I think there is much more than Ricoeur considers that can be borrowed from speech acts to 
show how action is propositional. We can see this when considering how work proposes. If 
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propositions are stated when speakers utter sentences, then the unit of the proposition is the 
sentence (Searle 1969: 29). Likewise, the unit of work can be said to be the task. Consider that a task 
proposes that an end be achieved, and furthermore that that task achievement involves a worker 
using objects to achieve an end. In this sense, the propositional nature of work involves a kind of 
 ‘ƐĂǇŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐĂĚŽŝŶŐ ?namely, a doing to achieve an end by way of the use of a tool. Units of work, 
or tasks, then can be seen distinctly in relation to specific ends that a job or role require. I will stress 
here that the locutions of work involve the use of equipment, or what is in the most general sense the 
employment of a tool or tools in view of an instrumental end.11 
 The subject-verb-predicate structure of sentences then has an analogous structure in work: 
worker-tool use-instrumental end. On this view, instrumental ends are not merely notional for a 
worker but are envisioned according to a specific means that is ready-to-hand (Heidegger 1962: 
98/69). In fact, we often find that we cannot think of such ends apart from specific tools. Digging a 
hole can scarcely be thought about absent the idea of using a spade or shovel. We might think of using 
our hands, but this tends to be consequent on not having access to a suitable tool. And although we 
may envisage an end we want to achieve abstractly and then find the appropriate equipment to 
achieve it, the equipment is the means by which we have an articulated relation to what we want and 
how we want to achieve something. In work, intention does not remain general but is specifically tied 
to equipment. For example, Julia may have the general intention to cut the grass, but the given tool 
will allow her to come into a specific relation to this end, or what I am saying allows Julia to articulate 
this end in a special way. Does she use shears? a push mower? an electric mower? Does she want to 
mulch as well as mow? Perhaps she prefers the agility of a zero turn mower? So although we can speak 
generally of intending to mow the lawn, in the means-end relation distinct to work, the equipment 
used in work articulates a specific relation to how the means allows us to achieve the end. It is this 
process of articulation that I want to call the propositional content of instrumental meaning 
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞůŽĐƵƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŽƌŬ ?tŚĞŶĞŶĚĂŶĚĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚĐŽŵĞƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ǁŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ƐĂŝĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂĐƚ
of work is how someone is going about achieving an end. 
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Furthermore, if the locution of work is defined by proposing something by means of achieving 
an end with equipment, then we can see that work involves two kinds of rules that will later help us 
to distinguish illocutionary and perlocutionary meanings. If work involves both the production of a 
work object (or how a person plans to make it) and the use of this object (or how a person plans to 
use it), then another way of describing this relation is to say that it involves complementary 
constitutive rules of making and using. On the one hand, there are methods and procedures to follow 
in making a thing of work, such as a mower. On the other hand, these methods and procedures have 
their end not just in satisfying the standards of a custom of craft or skill,12 but also the satisfaction of 
rules of use according to which a thing of work is applied or consumed by its user. As a species of 
action we can say that work is unique because the propositional content of work resides in how an 
act of making as well as an act of using are linked to instrumental ends, or what we can summarize as 
instrumentally constitutive rules of making and using. In fact, the expectations of what go into making 
and using at this level suggest that the locutions of any one kind of work can be encapsulated by what 
ĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶůŝƐƚĞĚŽŶƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞůĂďĞů ‘ũŽďĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?13 As we will see, the remit of the coupling making-
using becomes much broader with respect to illocution and perlocution, where ends are no longer 
instrumental. 
 
b) illocution  
The illocutionary dimension of action ? what is done in the act of doing ? refers to what takes 
place when performing an action and how it refers to conventional rules and meanings, or what is 
often termed as the sphere of practice or function (Searle 1969: 125). So what occurs in the 
performance of an action is with reference to rules of action; performative acts draw on and refer to 
rules constituting how an action should be done. Referring to the well-known example of promising, 
ZŝĐŽĞƵƌĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ ĂƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŝƐ ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĂŐŝǀĞŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ ‘ĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƐ ?ĂƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ? ?ZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ? ? ? ?ď P ? ? ? ?ĐĨ ?^ĞĂƌůĞ
1969: 149). By referring to constitutive rules of what counts as a promise, the act of promising is 
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ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŶŽƌǀĂĐƵŽƵƐ ?ƚŽƵƐĞ<ĞŶŶǇ ?ƐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ?ďƵƚĚƌŝǀĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽƌ
end. Actions like promising, or more widely culturally specific actions, therefore have an illocutionary 
force only because they can refer to and follow rƵůĞƐƚŚĂƚĂůůŽǁƚŚĞŵƚŽ ‘ ?ďƌŝŶŐ ?ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨ
ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇŝƚƐƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ? ?^ĞĂƌůĞĂŶĚsĂŶĚĞƌǀĞŬĞŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐĨŽƌĐĞŵĂǇ
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐůŝŬĞƉƌŽƉŽƐŝŶŐƚŽĐŽŵŵŝƚĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĚĞĞĚĂƚĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚƚŝŵĞ P ‘/ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƚŽƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŚĞ 
ďŽƌƌŽǁĞĚƐƵŵŽĨŵŽŶĞǇŽŶdƵĞƐĚĂǇ ? ?tŝƚŚŽƵƚƌƵůĞƐƚŽƌĞĨ ƌƚŽĂŶĚĨŽůůŽǁ ?ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨƉƌŽŵŝƐŝŶŐǁŽƵůĚ
be nonsensical. 
With respect to work, we can say that distinct from instrumentality (locution), the 
illocutionary force of work is revealed in terms of a wider range of meanings and ends that are 
conventional ? that is, pertaining to the constitution of a shared world of values and norms. This wider 
range emphasizes the normative inflection of how an act of work achieves its end. So what counts as 
a conventional use or application is related to the quality of performance when meeting an 
instrumental end. Is the performance in line with what we expect of someone in that role? Scooping 
ice cream, for example, is an instrumental end; but illocution-wise we might have certain standards 
about how the scoop sits atop the cone. How does scooping ice cream count as having created an ice 
cream cone? 
Another example: if we take the manufacturing of a chair, at one level there are conventions 
that attached to whatever instrumental end a particular chair might be used for. A chair used for 
relaxing will call up conventions relating to what one expects when relaxing. Should I be able to 
recline? Should the chair be specifically conducive to reading? At another level, the chair will inevitably 
be involved in conventions relating to location, practice, and other norms. A chair for relaxing does 
not stand by itself but fits within a location relationally defined by tables and lamps, which may form 
the space next to the fireside. Generally, Arendt (1958: 137) refers to the conventional role of work 
ĂƐ ŝƚƐ  ‘ĚƵƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ŽƌƚŚĞǁĂǇ ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƌŬŵaintains a space of human relations and meanings.14  
More specifically, we can note that the two levels of convention correlate with the rules of making 
ĂŶĚƵƐŝŶŐ ?dŚĂƚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ǁĞĐĂŶĨŝŶĚĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ƉĂƌĂƐŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĂƚƚĂĐŚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůƌƵůĞƐŽf 
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making, or what we expect beyond instrumental ends, and to rules of using, or what we expect of 
actions of work with respect to social and existential values. To recall, I referred to these at the outset 
as constitutive rules of convention with respect to making and using. 
In concluding this sub-section, it is worth noting that the rules of making and the rules of using 
do not have equal epistemological status. The rules of making are much more constricted in the sense 
that they apply to knowledge of how a thing is made and ought to be made in the procedural sense. 
Along the lines of speech act theory, we might even say that the rules of use are entailed by the rules 
of making, where the rules of making specify conditions according to which the rules of use can be 
executed.15 Yet, if the rules of use may derive from rules of making, we see that they are not confined 
to them. With respect to illocution, rules of use can involve a reflection on what counts as good use. 
(As we will see with perlocution, application of use is creative in ways that the original idea of a work 
object or tool did not anticipate.) In other words, they are practices, whose chief feature necessary 
for our reflection on them is their repeatability of achieving ends. Unique to the illocution of work is 
not only that it performs according to convention; it also constitutes the world concretely through 
creating and using objects. Repeatability is therefore linked to what Arendt ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ durability, or 
the capacity of work to allow for the recurrence of a similar kind of action or set of actions constituting 
a human world of norms and values ? relaxing, building a fire, reading a book, etc. And so, in contrast 
ƚŽůŽĐƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůƵƐĞ ?ŝůůŽĐƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞĞŶƚĂŝůƐƚŚĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽĨƉƌĂctices according to 
which we can repeat those actions we find conducive to the ends of living well. Furthermore, key to 
the repeatability of practices is that it allows us to consider our actions as constituting a whole if for 
ƚŚĞ ŽŶůǇ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ĂƐŬ  “tŚǇ ĚŽ ǁĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƚ ƚŽ ƌĞƉĞĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? dŚĞ ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ
illocution, to put it another way, is not without resource for critical reflection on its conventions. 
ůĂƐĚĂŝƌDĂĐ/ŶƚǇƌĞ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?^ŝŶŶŝĐŬƐ ? ? ? ? P ?? W31) therefore includes a capacity to rule 
follow as well as to question what counts as good for the worker and the organization of work.16 As 
MacIntyre (2016: 130 W31; 170 W71) points out with respect to the Japanese automobile industry after 
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WĞƌůŽĐƵƚŝŽŶƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĚŽŶĞďǇĚŽŝŶŐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ‘by ĚŽŝŶŐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐďĞǇŽŶĚ
the immediate content of the action and expectation of any norms governing what it means to 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐǁŚĂƚƵƐƚŝŶƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂƐ ‘ƐĞƋƵĞů ?ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ? ?
In terms of my opening remarks, we can say that perlocution refers to the efficaciousness of an action 
having to do with extra-constitutive effects. Searle (2005: 118) describes these in terms of effects on 
ƚŚĞůŝƐƚĞŶĞƌ P ‘ƵƚƚĞƌĂŶĐĞƐŶŽƌŵĂůůǇƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ? further effects on the 
ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ? ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂƌĞƌƐ ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŶŽƚ Ăůů ƐƉĞĞĐŚ ĂĐƚƐ ŚĂǀĞ
perlocutionary effects (Searle 1969: 46). This is because not all speech acts are intended to produce 
non-conventional effects. I will return to the issue of intentionality in the next section as this feature 
ŽĨ^ĞĂƌůĞ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚƚŽĂůĂƌŐĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞƐŝƐŝƐŽŶĞĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚ/ǁŝůůĚĞƉĂƌƚŐŝǀĞŶŵǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƌĞůŝĞƐ
heavily on the application of the object of work. (I take application in a broad sense to include 
application of a tool in a given activity of work and/or application of an object produced by work and 
for the use of anyone who chooses to do so.) 
At the moment, let us focus on the manner in which action is perlocutionary. If the analogy 
between discourse and action is convincing, then there is much more that needs to be explained with 
respect to the perlocutionary effects of action, something which Austin (1975: 107) notices but does 
ŶŽƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉǁŚĞŶŽďƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ ‘ĂŶĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌŝůǇůŽŶŐƐƚƌĞƚĐŚ ? ? ?ŽĨĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ?ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƚŽ
ĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚĂŬĞZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚƌĞĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞƚƌĂŝƚƐŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚĞ
burden of trying to explain how action is open to a broad range of perlocutionary consequences. These 
traits are the autonomy, relevance, and openness of action (Ricoeur 1973b: 100 W103). 
 The traits are mutually inclusive. The autonomy of action involves the manner in which any 
action can be freed from its original historical context and applied in other situations. This application 
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is not a neutral one but has a specific aim or intention. Application is thus the application of action 
within a context of relevance ŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŽŶĞ ? ‘ŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?
writes Ricoeuƌ ? ? ? ? ?ď P ? ? ? ? ? ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞĂĐƚƵĂůŝǌĞĚŽƌĨƵ ĨŝůůĞĚŝŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƚŚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ ? ?dŚĞopenness of action is simply an extension of the role 
of relevance. If an action can be applied to generate a novel effect or meaning, then this implies that 
action is like an open work. Performed at one time, it can be taken and applied to illuminate new 
meanings. 
So for Ricoeur action may occur as a specific event, but the event itself has a range of potential 
meaninŐƐ ?ŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐƚŽĨŝǆĞĚĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚƵƐŽƉĞŶƚŽŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ĂŶǇďŽĚǇǁŚŽĐĂŶ
ƌĞĂĚ ? ?ZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ? ? ? ?ď P ? ? ? ?ŝƚĂůŝĐƐŽŵŝƚƚĞĚ ? ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ŝĨǁĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŽĨ'ƵǇ&ĂǁŬĞƐƚŽ
bomb English Parliament in 1605 as an action, Ricoeur is arguing that its meaning is not confined to 
its immediate historical significance, where we might connect the action to religious and political 
division and plans to replace King James I with a Catholic monarch. Meaning is not even confined to 
potential competing arguments about what may have really happened. Indeed, we find its most 
recent, creative application in the Anonymous protest movement, which draws on the visage of 
Fawkes as represented by the comic book and film V for Vendetta (Ough 2015) and which is itself an 
interpretation of the original action we identify with Fawkes. Action is construed in a strong sense of 
requiring interpretation because the range of potential meanings related to it are not consequential 
or sequential effects in the classical sense of action theory (Ricoeur 1973b: 115),18 but correlative. 
Let us then extend these features of action to work. We have noted the autonomy of action 
to some extent in terms of the conventional meanings of rules of making and using. The action of work 
tends to free itself from the narrowly instrumental ends while the object produced in work can be 
taken up by anyone who wishes to use it. In the former, mowing the lawn may become attached not 
just to conventional expectations of a nice-looking yard but perhaps, at the extra-constitutive level, to 
ďĞŝŶŐĂǁŽƌŬŽĨůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉĞĂƌƚƚŚĂƚŚĞůƉƐƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞŽŶĞ ?ƐǁĞůů-being. In the latter, utile objects can 
be decorative or personal and hence taken out of their context of regular, intended usage. It is 
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therefore tempting to ask if there can indeed be an aberrant use of a product of work so long as the 
defining context of use precipitates this unusual use (cf. Searle 1969: 149 W50). 
We might also consider sequel effects in terms of how an activity of work shapes our 
perceptions and conversations. The nature of everyday conversation about mowing the lawn or 
making a fence might flow onto other topics by mere association. Using a hammer to make a fence 
might, for instance, find the conversation moving towards property lines, national boundaries, a 
dividing wall, the state of the U.S. presidency since 2017. The flow of conversation in an associative 
ŵĂŶŶĞƌŝƐǁŚĂƚƉŚŝůŽůŽŐǇƚĞƌŵƐƌĞĐŽǀĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?Žƌ ‘ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚŝƐĚĞƌŝǀĂďůĞĨƌŽŵ
the previous discourse recoƌĚ ? ?'ĞůƵǇŬĞŶƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?tŚŝůĞƚŚĞĨůŽǁŽĨĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝ ŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚůĞĂĚ
directly to a new application of the product or activity of work, it certainly increases the range of its 
potential application. All this is to say that the way in which meaningfulness arises in the course of 
work is due to a broader scope in which any particular act of work leaves its mark. 
Implicit in these examples is the capacity of perlocution to refigure19 the way we perceive 
ourselves, the world, and others. I will say more about this in the next section. At this point, let me 
encapsulate what I have attempted to do in this section by way of the following table: 
 
Constitutive Extra-Constitutive 













Simply put, meaning is predicated in three ways: 1) instrumental meaning, or locution; 2) conventional 
meaning, or illocution; and 3) extra-constitutional meaning, or perlocution. We can understand these 
three meanings alternatively as the meaning of fulfilling instrumental ends, the meaning of performing 
a task to a certain standard or expectation, and the meaning of an effect that changes how we perceive 
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ourselves, the world, and others. Meaningfulness is therefore not confined to operations internal to 
or specific to a kind of work, as it is often assumed, but is instead a dynamic interplay between these 
three dimensions. As an interplay, meaningfulness is not like an end state but more a process in which 
one hopes to achieve some kind of equilibrium. In the final section on capabilities, we will see how 
ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇĐĂŶŚĞůƉŽŶĞƚŽĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚƐĞŶƐĞŽĨǁĞůů-being. Finally, it is also worth 
recalling the theses on necessity in the conceptual and historical assumptions. The former conceives 
meaningfulness arising from the unavoidable nature of work, while the latter from its indispensable 
nature. Given the threefold distinction of meaning I have put forth, we can see some significant 
differences. Necessity, according to the analogy to speech acts, refers to the locutionary and 
illocutionary dimensions of work that meet instrumental and social (conventional) needs. The 
conceptual assumption could not provide an account of how non-necessary perceptions of well-being 
were tied to work, except as a relation of expression (of concepts we attribute to work). The analogy 
to speech acts has located this phenomenon in terms of ǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƉĞƌůŽĐƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?dŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌical 
assumption either discounts the perlocutionary as trivial because it is ideological and non-essential to 
ŽƵƌ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ? Žƌ ŝƚ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ƐĞĞ ůŽĐƵƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŝůůŽĐƵƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĞ Ăůů ? ŽĨ
meaningful work. 
 
Refiguration and the Extra-Constitutive Effects of Work 
I want to say a bit more about the perlocutionary dimension of work in order to emphasize its 
importance with regard to our capacity for innovation and creativity. Take the act of building a public 
road, for example. This act can be read not just at the locutionary level of essential road construction 
but at the illocutionary level of meeting the expectations of public works, which in this case might be 
allowing citizens to carry on with their commerce and commuting. Or, it might provide a network to 
access friends and family and thus count as a good road for social interconnectivity. We therefore find 
that an act of work has a plurivocity of meanings that are open to interpretation and argumentation. 
But what happens when we turn to an analysis of perlocution? Might road use conjure a sense of 
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ĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞ ?ĂƐǁŚĞŶ:ĂĐŬ<ĞƌŽƵĂĐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽǁŚĞƌĞƚŽŐŽďƵƚĞǀĞƌǇǁŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŽũƵƐƚ
ŬĞĞƉŽŶƌŽůůŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƐ ? ?Kƌ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌŝůǇ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŝƚŵŝŐŚƚŝŶƐƚŝůĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŚŽŵĞlessness because 
it refigures the landscape so that it is without a real center (Augé 1995: 67). We see that perlocution 
neatly captures work as an activity that allows us to see and make the world in novel ways, or what I 
want to call its ability to refigure our perception. In fact, refiguration opens the world to us in ways 
that extend beyond instrumental and conventional expectations, and it would appear that because of 
this, perlocution matters most about work. Or at the very least, we now have a counter-balance to 
the view that the matter of work is about its necessity. So in what follows, I want to make the case for 
changing our perception about the way work is not just necessary but significantly creative. 
I think we can begin to see this distinction with respect to a small point of contrast between 
Austin/Searle and Ricoeur. In the former, perlocution is not given much discussion in comparison to 
illocution. Arguably, this is because Austin (1975: 107) and Searle (1969: 46) develop their respective 
speech act theories according to speaker intentionality and any sequel effects are thereby limited as 
opposed to open, as Ricoeur would have it.20 But there is also something much more substantial at 
play. Considering Searle and Ricoeur on metaphorical speech acts helps to illustrate this point since 
both take metaphor to be meaning-creating yet by explaining the creative function in conflicting ways. 
^ĞĂƌůĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ĨŝŶĚƐĨĂƵůƚǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐ ‘ƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĂ ƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚZŝĐŽĞƵƌĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŽ
be on the right track since they locate how metaphorical predication occurs in a sentence by virtue of 
tensions and clashes of meaning (Ricoeur 1973a; 1977: Study 3). For Searle, predication results not 
internal to the sentence but because the metaphorical meaning is not determined by the truth 
conditions of the sentence. For Searle ?ƚŚĞŚĞĂƌĞƌ ‘ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŚŝƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ? ĞƚĐ ? ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ǁŚĞŶ Ă ƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ŵĂŬĞƐ Ă ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌŝĐĂů
assertion ?ǁŚĞŶƐĂǇŝŶŐ ‘S is P ?ƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌŵĞĂŶƐ ‘S is R ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? W85).
dŚĞƵƉƐŚŽƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝƐƚŚĂƚZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂůůŽǁƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ
in metaphorical utterances despite speaker intention. This is not to say speaker intention does not 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?Ɛ concern is rather that the hard cases for a philosophy of language and action involve 
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not having access to speaker/actor intention, though we may speak or act under the pretense of doing 
so, as in talking about what Shakespeare meant when writing Hamlet. ZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌ
ƐƉŝƌŝƚĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?Ɛ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞĨƌĂŝŶĨƌŽŵƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŝĚĞĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?ŽďǀŝŽƵƐ ?ŽƌĐĂŶďĞĞĂƐŝůǇĚĞĐŝƉŚĞƌĞĚ ?DƵĐŚŽĨ^ĞĂƌůĞ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƌĞůŝĞƐ
on the integrity of speaker/author intention, something with which Derrida famously takes issue (cf. 
Moati 2014: 100; 117 W18) and with which Ricoeur would agree vis-à-vis his acceptance of the 
autonomy of the text (Ricoeur 1991: 143, 225, 326). 
So if perlocution matters most with respect to the function of work, it does so because some 
aspect of work allows for creative re-application regardless of an original intention of someone who 
makes something to be used in work. For Ricoeur, the feature of action that allows for its retrieval and 
re-interpretation is its inscription-ůŝŬĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌ ‘ĐŽŝŶĐŝĚĞƐǁŝƚŚ
ůŽŐŝĐĂů ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ?ď P  ? ? ? ? ? /ĨǁŽƌŬŝƐĂƵŶŝƋƵĞƐƉĞĐŝĞƐŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞŶǁĞŵŝŐŚƚ
expect this inscription event occurring in a distinct way. In fact, we have already replied to this point 
in terms of the durability of work which inscribes the conventional in the world. Furthermore, this 
means that extra-constitutive meanings are potential and are indexed to the application of a tool or 
work object (as in rules of use at the instrumental and conventional levels). Or, we can say rather 
clumsily that they reside in potential and are activated when someone uses equipment or work objects 
in a novel way. Conceiving work aloŶŐƚŚĞƐĞ ůŝŶĞƐŚĂƐĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽǀĞƌ^ĞĂƌůĞ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨ
perlocution since it can track the often spontaneous and unpredictable ways in which things are used. 
Let us take another example of extra-constitutive effects in work. If we consider a shovel used 
in building a level foundation for the construction of a home, then the locutionary dimension would 
involve creation of a foundation per rules of doing so. The illocutionary dimension would call upon 
standards of craft and building in assessing what has been laid. The perlocutionary dimension might 
be something like a revelation about a sense of history when discovering the stratification of the soil 
when digging, perhaps prompted by finding an artifact. In a classic Heideggerian sense, the 
prominence of the use of the equipment recedes as we become more intrigued by the different layers 
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of soil and their historical significance. And yet all the while, it was the shovel that enabled this 
reflection. 
So how, then, should we say tools and objects of work are involved in extra-constitutive 
meaning predication? A short answer is to reply that any use of such an object that lends itself towards 
a kind of reflection and discovery of meanings beyond the immediate focus of the use of that object 
makes a good candidate for extra-constitutive meaning predication. A longer reply would involve 
specifying the various ways in which such use originates and then expands with regard to meanings 
beyond an immediate instrumental focus. We might consider, for example, the use of objects in 
building, production, acquisition, everyday activities, and service.21 Perlocutionary meanings would be 
defined relative to the work activity itself in order to get a sense of the remit in which they would be 
linked broadly to a refiguration of how we view ourselves, the world, and others. If perlocution is what 
matters most for work, it is not because it transcends locution and illocution. It is because perlocution 
characterizes what we think to be most important about work ? namely, renewal. 
 
Capabilities, Work, and Speech Acts 
The meanings which I have termed extra-constitutive are properly poetic (creative) in the sense that 
they allow us to see ourselves, the world, and others anew (cf. Ricoeur 1973a). Because of this 
emphasis, meaningfulness can be said to lie in the realm of application ? whether this application 
ĞǆŝƐƚƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶũŽďŽƌŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽŶĞ ?ƐũŽď ?tŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞŶŽƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚŽŶŝƐŚŽǁĂǁŽƌŬĞƌ
within his or her own role can see his or her work as meaningful. In this section, I want to say more 
about this with respect to capabilities. Why capabilities? 
 The reason for this is mostly practical. It should be an expectation of a philosophy of work to 
have practical implications, and one way of doing this is to link an analysis of concepts and relations 
ƚŽĂǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚŽƐĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽŚŝƐŽƌŚĞƌĨůŽƵƌŝƐŚŝŶŐ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ
to Amartya Sen (1993), the Capabilities Approach (CA hereafter) addresses this with respect to 
functionings, or those things tŚĂƚŽŶĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐĂƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐŽŶĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞŐŽďĞƐƚ ?
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group of functionings informs a specific capability (Sen 1993: 38). Nourishment is a basic functioning 
ǁĞĂůůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨŝƚŵĞĂŶƐŽŶĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞǁŽƵůĚďĞĚĞƉůĞƚĞĚŽĨĂďĂƐŝĐƐtandard of living. Having 
a good career might be another functioning, and though less basic than nourishment it should still 
ĨŝŐƵƌĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽůŝǀĞ ?/ŶǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚŝƐ ?^ĞŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĂƐƚŚĞĂŝŵŽĨ
creating an evaluative space in which a worker can gain a better sense of whether or not functionings 
ĂƌĞďĞŝŶŐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚŽƌĂƌĞŝŶĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚǁŝƚŚŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŐŝǀĞŶŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?&ŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ŝĨZĂĐŚĂĞůǀĂůƵĞƐ
the functionings of a good career and the freedom of religion, there could be a situation where the 
two conflict if her work meant, for some reason, that she had to conceal her religious affiliation or if 
certain practices at work clashed with a religious precept that she held. CA would allow Rachael to 
recognize this conflict and to reflect on the extent to which the conflict was insuperable and 
problematic.22 If the ongoing achievement of functionings is seen to comprise meaningfulness, self-
evaluation then becomes a matter of determining which and how many functionings are affirmed. So 
what does the analogy to speech acts add? 
 Let us hearken back to one of my central concerns about the reduction of meaningfulness to 
ďĞůŝĞĨƐĂŶĚĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐĂďŽƵƚŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞconceptual assumption). CA breaks this reduction by turning 
to valued functionings which are arguably objective in the sense that as a human being and as a 
member of a particular community, a certain range of functionings deemed to be essential and 
important will inform our understanding.23 However, where CA wavers to some extent is on the 
linkage ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐƐ. Is it the case that some functionings are inherent 
to forms of work? Is it a matter of a person believing it to be the case and asserting so? Is it a mixture 
of both? 
The analogy to speech acts allows us to see meaningfulness and functionings in terms of the 
three dimensions of performance: the instrumental (locutionary), conventional (illocutionary), and 
extra-constitutive (perlocutionary) effects. Furthermore, the specifically extra-constitutive dimension 
of perlocution allows one to distinguish a broader sphere in which functionings clearly extend beyond 
work-specific ends. With the example of Rachael, it could be argued that the functionings of a good 
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career and freedom of religion should not really be bundled together as long as the latter was not 
substantially violated. (Let us assume for the sake of argument that the conflict involves a consulting 
business whose work has the potential of clashing with a religious precept against usury since a bulk 
of its main clients consist in mortgage lenders.) Someone might therefore argue ? perhaps a Kantian 
ǁŚŽ ƚĂŬĞƐ <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ŶŽƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ?that the means and ends innate to the 
workplace are those which should be kept separate from other (public) ends. In one sense this is 
true ? that is, in an instrumental (locutionary) sense of achieving work-specific targets, and in a 
conventional (illocutionary) sense of the quality of ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ũŽď ? dŚĞ ŶŽŶ-conventional 
(perlocutionary) effects may not be directly related to the work but could in fact have higher standing 
in relation to non-work values, especially if their extra-ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŝƐŽŶĞƚŚĂƚĂĨĨĞĐƚƐZĂĐŚĂĞů ?Ɛ
perception of herself, the world, and others. 
>ĞƚƵƐƐĂǇƚŚĂƚŝŶZĂĐŚĂĞů ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚǁŝƚŚƵƐƵƌǇĂƌŝƐĞƐďǇĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚĞƌĞ
consulting for businesses that lend money is linked by her to the housing market, which in turn is 
linked by her to her own community where such a market has resulted in problems involving the 
proliferation of second homes, on the one hand, and foreclosures, on the other hand. Her community 
is depleted of regular neighbors, and not only has the value of property made it difficult for her to own 
a home (due to increased speculation by aspiring second-home owners) but the communal ethos has 
been diluted. So what sense can Rachael make of this conflict? Whatever she decides, my account of 
the poetics of work would enable her to see and explore how work-related ends stand against other 
ends that are by no means less significant since such ends can be identified within a wider scope of 
meaningfulness. When the analogy to speech acts and CA are taken in tandem, then we not only have 
ĂŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐŵĂŬŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞŐŽǁĞůů ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽĂǁĂǇŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ
points of contact, affirmation, and conflict that perform this. 
 
If I have made a convincing case for the unique way in which work functions, I want to conclude with 
a few remarks on two limitations that would require further analysis and comment. First, how 
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extensively are we to take this analogy to speech acts? Should we be content with it as a heuristic 
device which begs ontological and metaphysical questions about what work is really like? Does this 
heuristic mean we are merely relying on some kind of linguistic representation or correlation of a 
fundamental action and confess that we can never really know its true nature? My inclination is to say 
heuristics is helpful in this case because it latches on to what is true about work even though we may 
not have a metaphysical account that explains why work is discourse or discourse-like. The paradox 
is: Can we ever rely on a non-materialistic means of accurately representing the meaning of a material 
action? Obviously, without further argumentation, trusting in the analogy to discourse risks a kind of 
idealism about linguistic universality for which hermeneutics is known. Presumably further 
consideration would provide a compelling account of how a reflection on the fundamental nature 
work should not seek some origin absent of non-material relations (à la Marx) but acknowledge a 
version of the hermeneutical circle in which work is bound up (already) with those actions, rules, 
practices, modes of being, and forms of life that are non-material and symbolic. Whatever the case, 
the claim that this circular relation between work and discourse is virtuous must here, in this version 
of the poetics or work, remain its presupposition. 
 Second, what I have not done is provide a way of determining which kinds of work are 
potentially more meaningful by virtue of their locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary effects. A 
potential criticism of what I have presented lies in the allegation that my account could be used to 
justify and valorize degrading forms of work as long as it can be shown there is some form of meaning 
predication involved. I have omitted commenting on this because such a task goes well beyond the 
poetics that I intended to outline and reaches towards questions of justice. Nonetheless, the view I 
have presented is not without resources to respond to this criticism. Linking the poetics to CA means 
recognizing and taking seriously the evaluative space in which one can compare and contrast 
functionings and how they are being affirmed or denied. A more complete role for CA would involve 
evaluating the range of functionings of any one person or community from the outside ? are the 
functionings a worker takes seriously themselves problematic? But far from being unaddressed 
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problems for the view I have proposed, I see the poetics of work as providing a firm ground upon 
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what counts as value-creation. For more on the classical bias and its philosophical underpinnings, see (reference 
omitted for blind review). 
5 For a detailed account of this, see (reference omitted for blind review). 
6 sĞůƚŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ŶŽƚĞƐƌĞŶĚƚ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨDĂƌǆƚŚĂƚŚŝƐĞůĞǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůĂďŽƌĂƐƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƚĞŶĚƐƚŽ
increase consumptive behaviour as opposed to actions characteristic of self-actualization or eudaimonia.  
7 Steger et Ăů ?Ɛ ?2012: 323 W325) claim about work involving eudaimonic growth is no exception since they do not 
give a justification of how eudaimonia is objective or universal ? i.e., not just a matter of personal growth. On 
eudaimonia and relativism, see Hursthouse (2001). Testimony about meaningful work has been referred to as 
ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ĂŶ ĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ǁŽƌŬ ĂŶĚ Ă ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ ƚƌĂŶƐĐĞŶĚĞŶƚ ůŝĨĞ
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞƐĞůĨ ? ?ĂŝůĞǇĂŶĚDĂĚĚĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?dŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŝŶƐƵĐŚsociological studies is not so much that 
there is, objectively speaking, a meaningful essence or nature to work, but more an integral link between an 
attitude or perception of well-ďĞŝŶŐĂŶĚŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŚĂůŽĨƐŬǇ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ĐĨ ?DƵŝƌŚĞĂĚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? 
8 Examples of conceptual association vary. One commonality is the idea that reference to certain attributes or 
effects is ĂŶĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽŝŶƐƚĂŶƚŝĂƚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůŶĞƐƐ ?ĞĂƚĞZŽĞƐƐůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ŶŽƚŝĐĞƐ
a similar problem and opts instead to define work according to a broad spectrum of values, which includes 
autonomy, non-alienation, and social recognition (cf. Schwartz 1982). Yet Roessler only associates work with 
existential and political concepts. James Murphy (1993) and Adrian Walsh (1994) define work in terms of 
theoretical (conception) and practical (execution) dimensions ? i.e. how the two interrelate in any activity of 
work. But note that the association can be deemed accidental, or as Hume might say imagined, since the relation 
can be coincidental or correlative but not integral. For example, Walsh (1994: 245 W46) sees meaningfulness 
arising via a self-reflective process in which the theory one holds and uses in relation to an activity, such as 
painting, is open to revision by means of reflecting on the obstacles and problems one encounters. The worry 
here is that the interplay between theory and practice seems too general and does not appear to distinguish 
anything unique about the way in which work produces meaning. An activity like playing snooker might achieve 
the same ends, and we might question on most occasions whether this was work. Veltman (2016) dedicates a 
chapter to discussing what makes work meaningful, offering a detailed analysis of how meaning is multi-
dimensional and becomes involved in ways that can be missed if we are interested in a singular definition of 
meaningfulness. But again, the links are associative, where what makes work meaningful is the fact that we 
observe such things as self-respect, a sense of purpose, or the exercise of skill as arising from work. 
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9 / Žŵŝƚ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ^ĞĂƌůĞ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? W ? ? ? ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ŽĨ ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ůŽĐƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ĂŶĚ
illocutionary utterances since Ricoeur follows Austin. At some level, the distinction between locution and 
illocution is problematic with respect to what Searle (1968) notes in terms of some sayings (constatives) relying 
on illocutionary content to determine the sense-reference relation and indeed that locution and illocution are 
often bound up with one another. 
10 There is an interesting point of comparison in how Ricoeur and Austin regard action. Austin (1975: 112) refers 
ƚŽ ‘ŵŝŶŝŵƵŵƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ?ĂĐƚƐĂƐƚŚŽƐĞĂĐƚƐǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŵƚŽůĂĐŬ a vocabulary for naming them since nomenclature 
with action tends to be tied to its consequences. Action, properly speaking, already figures into the realm of 
communication, convention, and effect. So non-minimal actions are already imbued with a sense and reference 
(locution) as well as some conventional significance (illocution). Ricoeur (1986: 255 W56) would say, following 
ůŝĨĨŽƌĚ'ĞĞƌƚǌ ?ƐThe Interpretation of Cultures (1973), that non-minimal action is already symbolic.  
11 Following Heidegger (1962: 97/68), I will designate this use of objects as equipment [das Zeug]. 
12 I leave aside economic constraints, such as how mass production or control of the means of production by a 
few influences the quality of work. These are important matters but outside the remit of this essay. 
13 My thanks to XXX for noting this connection. 
14 I make a liberal use of Arendt since although I rely on her analysis of work, my assumption that work is an 
action can be construed as incompatible with her distinctions between labor, work, and action. I press this point 
further in section three when equating work with renewal, or as Arendt might say, natality. There is perhaps 
ƌŽŽŵƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵŽĨǁŽƌŬŵŝŐŚƚ ?ŽŶƌĞŶĚƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ƌĞĂĐŚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƌƚĚŽĞƐŽŶůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
it is non-utilitarian. My claim that work is creative and extra-constitutive may be compatible with this view in 
some respect. 
15 This relation may be a bit cumbersome given that Searle (1969: 154 W55) refers to a distinction between 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƵƐĞ ?ŽƌƚƌƵƚŚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ƌĞůĂƚĞƐ to the analysis of 
description and not meaning in the sense I intend it with regard to work and its world-constituting function. This 
difference merely anticipates a disagreement about what the creative function of discourse is. I discuss this 
briefly with respect to metaphor in the third section. 
16 Linking illocution to practice would require addressing important issues raised by Rae Langton (1993) and 
Jennifer Hornsby (1998) about illocution, authority, and freedom that I leave here untreated. 
17 My thanks to XXX for referring me to MacIntyre (2016). 
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18 ZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƚĞƌŵƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚ ŝŶĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŶĂůŽŐǇ ?ŽŶĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽƌĞǀŝƐĞƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
understanding of sequel effects as being directly intended or related. Indeed, I attempt to do so in the next 
ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ůƐŽƚŽŶŽƚĞ PƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂƉĂƌĂůůĞůŚĞƌĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶZŝĐŽĞƵƌ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞƌƌŝĚĂ ?Ɛ
understanding of intentionality (or lack thereof) in speech acts. What Ricoeur describes under the banner of 
interpretation, Derrida describes under iteration. See Raoul Moati (2014: 38 W40). 
19 Comment and reference omitted for blind review. 
20 Austin (1975: 107) does recognize unintentional effects to some extent yet not significantly. 
21 I have discussed an example of building with respect to the shovel. Let me briefly note details about the other 
categories. Production includes the use of capital goods in the classical economic sense of things used to produce 
things of value. Acquisition involves the use of things to acquire natural resources. What I am calling everyday 
activities, for lack of a better term, encompasses the use of those objects we rely upon to perform our daily tasks 
that are not directly related to the kind of work we associate with a paid career or job. It can also include the 
non-use of objects as when they are on display or stored for future use or simply for appreciation (aesthetic, 
sentimental, or otherwise). Finally, service is an umbrella term for those activities that may not result in the 
production of an object but nonetheless use such objects in carrying out a conventionally recognized task of 
value. 
22 ^ĞŶ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŝƐ ? ŽĨ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ? &Žƌ ŽŶĞ ? ŚĞ ƐĞĞƐ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ďƵŶĚůĞƐ ŽĨ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐƐ ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ ŝŶ
different situations. See Sen (1993: 38 W50). 
23 Sen (1993: 48 W49) wishes to keep the range of functionings incomplete while Nussbaum (2011) argues for a 
more prescriptive list of capabilities that can form rights to capabilities. 
